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In addition to farm work, most farm households in developed countries have at least one 
person working off-farm. The purpose of this paper is to examine if, and how, 
government payments, personal characteristics and household characteristics affect labor 
allocation of farm operators and their spouses, and the decisions to hire labor. We 
estimate an 8-regime multinomial logit model and a three equation multivariate probit 
model to quantify these impacts. Results indicate that age of household members is 
consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis on increasing then decreasing labor market par, 
and is positively associated with demand for hired labor. Hired farm labor and off farm 
activities increase with the operator education levels. As household size increases, a 
household member is more likely to work off the farm. Increasing net worth is found to 
have a positive impact on probability of spouses working on the farm as well as hired 
labor being used. Both coupled and decoupled payments increase demand for hired labor 
which is consistent both with farm expansion and reduced family labor time on the farm. 
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There is a well-established literature documenting impacts of agricultural policies. Most 
studies have focused on the macro-impacts on markets for products and land (e.g., Lence, 
and Mishra, 2003), the environment, (e.g., Just and Antle, 1990) or farm structure and 
productivity (e.g., Huffman and Evenson, 2001; Ahearn, Yee, and Huffman, 2002; 
Ahearn, Yee, and Korb, 2005). There is also a vast literature on the effects of government 
studies on land and land values (e.g., Lence, and Mishra, 2003) and income (e.g., 
Dewbre, and Mishra, 2002.) More recently, as micro-level data have become increasingly 
available studies of the impact of farm program payments have narrowed to estimation at 
the farm household level examining relationships between government policy and farm 
incomes (e.g., Dewbre, and Mishra, 2002) and household labor allocation (El-Osta, 
Mishra, and Ahearn, 2004; Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre, 2006). 
 
The literature on labor allocation and government policy has shown that the receipt of 
government payments (depending on their nature and requirements) may cause 
households to work more or less on the farm, more or less off-farm, and enjoy more or 
less leisure time (e.g., El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn, 2004). In modern U.S. agriculture 
accounting for off-farm employment is of primary importance since most farm 
households have at least one member opting for off-farm employment (El-Osta, Mishra, 
and Ahearn, 2004) and the income from that employment is the dominant form of 
(permanent) income for households. The role of off-farm earnings in reducing income 
variability has also served as a stabilizing factor in slowing the exit of families from the 
farm population that was seen in the thirty years following World War II (Ahearn, El-
Osta, and Dewbre.) 
 
This article builds on previous empirical studies examining the effect of government 
payments on labor allocation (El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn, 2004; Ahearn, El-Osta, and 
Dewbre, 2006.) Extending these previous analyses, we consider the linkage between 
household labor allocation and hired labor demands by the farm business. Failure to 
model the entire labor regime of the household and farm business simultaneously 
presents serious potential for biased inference if household labor and hired labor are not 
perfectly substitutable due to specific human capital, monitoring costs, or the existence of 
required management input that can only be provided by household members. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: First, we present the standard theory of time allocation 
for the farm household followed by a brief literature review. Following this we report on 
the data used for the study and the econometric models to be estimated. Finally, we 
present the results and discussion from the empirical models, and offer conclusions and 
areas for further investigation. 
 
Theory of Time Allocation 
Farm households maximize their (joint) utility by deciding how to allocate their income 
to consumption and their time between farm work, off-farm work, and leisure. The 
inclusion of time follows from the “full” income concept of the household (Hallberg et 
al., 1991). A key factor to consider when allocating household time is the wage rate from 
the farm and off-farm sector, and the opportunity cost or implicit price of leisure. In the 
standard household model, when there is an increase in non-labor income, an individual  4
will work less and enjoy more leisure because there is no change in the return from work. 
Reduction in time spend at work arises from the wealth effect associated with increased 
income. However, if for example there is an increase in the wage rate in the farm sector, 
ambiguity arises. On one hand, an individual may want to work more on-farm and less 
off-farm, because each farm work hour is paid more. On the other hand, an individual 
may want to work less on-farm and off-farm because they can get the same income by 
working less and have more time for leisure. Depending on which of these effects 
dominates the number of total work hours may increase, stay the same, or decrease 
(Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre, 2006.)  
 
The mathematical development here follows the organization and notation originally 
published in Hallberg et al. (1991.) The farm household is assumed to maximize the 
following household-utility function: 
Maximize  ) , , , , , ( Z H H L L Y U U
s o s o =                                                   (1) 
Where superscripts o and s indicate “operator” and “spouse” respectively. Household 
utility depends on the inputs of goods purchased for direct or indirect consumption (Y), 
and of time allocated to leisure by the operator (
o L ) and the spouse (
s L ). Household 
utility also depends on the operator and the spouse’s human capital variables (
s o H H , ) 
that are currently fixed but affect the efficiency of household production, e.g., schooling 
and experience of adults. The utility function also needs to take into account other 
household and area characteristics that might generate shifts in utility and demands, e.g., 
climate, number of children in the household, commuting distance to shopping, 
recreation, and schooling centers (Z.)  
 
The level of utility attainable is constrained at several levels. First consider the human 
time constraint. The available times of the operator and spouse are identified separately 
because endowed and acquired skills may be different. The allocation of operator’s and 
spouse’s time endowments is summarized by the following two equations, which provide 
all possible outlets for time use in either leisure, farm work, or off-farm work. Note that 
we assume the farm operator will have a strictly positive allocation of time to the farm 
business. 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , > ≥ > > + + =
o o o o o o o o F OF L T F OF L T                                                   (2) 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , ≥ ≥ > > ≥ + + =
s s s s s s s s s F OF L T OF F OF L T                                     (3) 
 
The farm household may receive annual income from the net return on the farming 
operation, off-farm earnings, and returns to non-farm assets. These receipts are spent on 
goods for direct or indirect household consumption. (Savings and investments are ignored 
here as means of simplifying the model.) The farm household is assumed to be 
competitive in farm output and input markets (i.e, individually they do no affect the 
prices that they pay for inputs or receive for outputs.) The budget constraint on household 
cash income is the following: 
V OF w OF w x r Y p Y p
s s o o
f f f f y + + + − = ' '                                                               
(4) 
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The expenditures must equal the net farm household cash income. The expenditures are 
represented by Y p y , Y being the consumption of goods and  y p  being the price of the 
goods. The net farm household cash income is the summation of several components: the 
net farm income defined as revenue above variable costs ( f f f f x r Y p − ), the off-farm 
income (
s s o o OF w OF w ' ' + ) and the annual income of nonfarm assets and other non-
labor returns to the farm (V). The net farm income equals the revenue, from the sales of 
f Y  at the price  f p , minus the cost of a quantity  f x  of purchased farm inputs at the price  
f r . The off farm income is based on the amount (
o OF ) of operator off farm work at the 
wage rate net of direct cost of commuting ( ) ( '
o o o o M C w w − = ), and the amount (
s OF ) 
of spouse off farm work at the wage rate net of direct cost of commuting 
( ) ( '
s s s s M C w w − = ). C represents the commuting cost per hour worked and M 
represents the commuting distance. Finally, farm households generally have nonfarm 
assets, e.g., stocks, bonds, savings, etc., and annual income from these assets is 
represented by V. 
 
The off-farm labor demand or wage offer equations facing the operator and the spouse 
are assumed to depend on their marketable human capital (H), local labor market 
characteristics (M) and job characteristics ( m Z .) Wage rates are assumed to be 
independent of hours worked to simplify the model. The market labor demand functions 
are summarized as: 
W=w(H,M,  m Z )                                                                                                             (5) 
 
For simplicity, we assumed one aggregate farm output f Y . The output is produced using 
operator’s and spouse’s farm time (
s o F F , ) and purchased inputs ( f x ), including 
farmland services and labor hired from other households. The efficiency of farm 
production is assumed to depend on the human capital of the husband and wife 
(
s o H H , ), e.g., formal schooling, prior farming experience, public agricultural research 
and extension, and other exogenous farm-specific characteristics ( f Z ), i.e., length of 
growing season, annual precipitation, and soil characteristics. The following concave 
production function represents the technology of farm production: 








f x Y F Y F Y Z H H x F F F Y           (6) 
 
The production function (6) is substituted into the budget constraint (4) to obtain a farm 
technology-constrained measure of household net cash income: 
V OF w OF w x r Z H H x F F F p Y p





f y + + + − = ' ' ) , , , , , (                         
(7) 
 
The decision problem facing the household is now to simultaneously choose the 
quantity of consumption goods to purchase, the hours of operator and spouse on-farm and 
off-farm work, and the quantity of purchased farm inputs to maximize household welfare, 
i.e., maximizing the function φ :  6
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Using the Kuhn Tucker conditions, we can get the operator and the spouse off-farm 
labor-supply function:  
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In focusing on off-farm work decisions, an equation for the probability of an individual 
participating in off-farm work is of particular interest. In the agricultural household 
model, rational individuals are assumed to participate in off-farm work when their 
reservation wage (for farm and leisure time) is less than the off-farm wage rate offered in 
the market. The wage offer or off-farm labor demand function is equation (5). The 
reservation wage is defined as the marginal value of an individual’s time when he/she 
allocates all of his/her time to farm and leisure time (and zero hours to off-farm work.) 
An equation for this relationship is obtained by taking equation (9) for the operator and 
(10) for the spouse, setting  0 =
o OF or  0 =
s OF , and solving for 
o
R
o w w = ' or 
s
R
s w w = ' : 
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Let j=o,s and define  j D equal to 1 if  '
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Where Pr(.)=probability for an event to occur. Thus, the probability of an individual 
participating in off-farm work depends on all the exogenous variables that enter his/her 
reservation wage and off-farm wage equations. Estimates of these participation equations 
provide information about the marginal effects of exogenous variables on the probability 
of an individual participating in off-farm work. 
 
For the topic of this paper, we are looking at government subsidies and their effect on 
labor allocation. On one hand, coupled payments refer to subsidies that require the 
landowner and/or producer to plant a specific commodity in order to receive the subsidy, 
with (in some cases) subsidy amounts received dependent on the quantity produced. For 
this reason, coupled payment should be associated with longer hours working on the farm 
because they will increase returns to farm time. On the other hand, decoupled payments   7
do not require the landowner and/or producer to plant a specific commodity to receive the 
subsidy and decisions made by the producer cannot affect the level of receipt of these 
type of payments.  This makes government payments similar to non-labor income and 
therefore should be correlated with less total work hours(on and/or off the farm) and 
more leirsure time (Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre, 2006.) However, a greater 
consumption of leisure by the farm household may not translate into a lower agricultural 
supply because household labor may be substituted by hired labor (El-Osta, Mishra, and 
Ahearn, 2004). For this reason, we explicitly model hired labor jointly with household 
labor allocation.  
 
Literature Review 
El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn (2004) considered the impacts of the Agricultural Market 
Transition Act (AMTA)/Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments and other 
government payments on both farm and off-farm labor allocation. They did not include 
hired labor. They used a Tobit model with the independent variable being off-farm hours, 
an OLS model with the dependent variable being on-farm hours, and an additional OLS 
model with total work hours being the dependent variable. Several control variables were 
included and are similar to the ones in our study. In addition to the control variables in 
this paper, El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn (2004), control variables such as the 
unemployment rate and the employment in several sectors were included in their study. 
They used the same dataset as this paper but for the year 2001 while we look at the year 
2003. They found that government payments tend to increase the hours operators work on 
their farm and decrease the hours they work off the farm. This conclusion was true for 
both the coupled and decoupled government payments. However, they remarked that 
these impacts on labor allocation are fairly small in magnitude. 
 
Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre (2006) only focused on off-farm labor participation. They 
examined if, and how the recent change (the inclusion in the 1996 Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act, FAIR, of the Production Flexibility Contract, PFC, 
Payments that are supposed to be somewhat decoupled)  in the nature of government 
farm programs had affected the off-farm labor participation of farm operators. They used 
a bivariate probit model with the dependent variable looking at both operator and spouse 
off-farm labor. They examined if this variable was impacted by transition Payments 
(AMTA or PFC), marketing loan or loan deficiency payments (LDP), conservation 
reserve program payments (CRP), and marketing loan assistance and all other payments. 
They also included unemployment information from the Census Bureau.  They also used 
data from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (1996 and 1999 Cost and 
Returns Report Survey.) They included several control variables and additional dataset 
such as commuting zones from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Their conclusion was that both the coupled and decoupled payments 
have a negative effect on off-farm labor participation. Their data also show that despite 
the effect of government payments, there is a “continuation of the long-term trend toward 





For consistency and because of availability of the data, we used the same dataset as 
previous studies (El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn, 2004; Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre, 
2006). However, a more recent year, 2003, is used here. The data are from the 2003 Cost 
and Returns Report version of the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) 
(ERS web site). Since its inception in 1996, the ARMS is USDA’s primary vehicle for 
collecting farm data on a wide range of issues about resource use, costs, farm financial 
conditions, and agricultural production. The ARMS has many versions with the Cost and 
Returns Report version offering the most data for the estimation of production costs and 
returns of agricultural commodities, and household farm and off-farm incomes.  
 
The sample used in the analysis considers only those farm households
1 with married 
couples, with the operator working on the farm, producing some corn or soybeans
2. 
Furthermore, the data is restricted to the Heartland region. The Heartland region includes 
portions of South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and 
Minnesota (http://www.nass.usda.gov/mn/agstat05/p007012.pdf.) After placing these 
restrictions, our working sample included 2017 farms. No auxiliary dataset was used. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Explanatory variables used in both models include personal characteristics, family 
indicators, farm attributes and a location control variable. Personal characteristics include 
age and education of the operators, this same information for operator’s spouse was not 
available. Data on operator’s education provides information on the highest level of 
schooling which we translate to years of education using a value of 10 if the operator has 
been to high school but has not completed high school, the value of 12 for completed 
high school, 14 for some college, 16 for completed four year degree, and 18 for graduate 
school
3. Other household attributes include the number of persons living in the household 
in 2003, and the non farm net worth for the household. Farm attributes include the farm 
net worth, the farm organization (whether or not the farm business is organized as a sole 
proprietorship.) Net worth represents the household equity and is used as a measure of 
wealth. Government payments are combined into decoupled (direct payments, 
conservation payments such as CRP) and coupled payments (loan deficiency payments, 
marketing loan gains, etc.)  
 
Table 1 includes the summary of the definitions of explanatory variables and their 
sample means and standard deviation. Table 1 also includes some additional variables: 
labor allocation, farm and total household income. We consider all these variables to be 
predetermined although it may be argued that some of them are determined 
simultaneously with the labor regimes. Consequently, one should be cautious when 
making causal interpretations of the results.  
                                                 
1 Non-family farms are not included. 
2 Harvested acres for corn or soybean must be greater than 0. 
3 The attribution of numerical values to levels of education follows from quantifying the typical years of 
education represented in matriculation and is constructed to conserve degrees of freedom. As has been 
noted by some reviewers of this work, this is a highly imperfect method of handling education as an 
explanatory variable that should be corrected.   9
 
Table 1 indicates that operators on average work on the farm more hours than their 
spouses but less off farm than their spouses. The average age of the operator is fairly high 
(about 52 years.) On average, respondents have completed high school and may even 
have a higher level of education. Most farms are sole or family proprietorship. Most 
households have a little bit over three members and have an off farm wealth considerably 
lower than their on farm wealth. On average, respondents received over $16,000 in 
government payments, with almost ¾ coming from decoupled payments.  
 
Multinomial Logit Model 
The first model used in this paper is based on Benjamin and Kimhi (2006) who created 
a discrete-choice model for labor decisions of farm couples in France by using a 
multinomial logit model. As all operators work on the farm, our multinomial logit model 
has eight choices, including all the permutations of three binary decisions: the spouse 
works on the farm, either the operator or the spouse works off-farm or not, and whether 
or not the farm uses hired labor. Table 2 shows the distribution of households in the 
sample according to the 8 regimes. About 53% of the operators’ spouses worked on the 
farm. About 73% of the farms had a family member working in an off-farm job. Finally, 
about 38% of the farms used hired labor.  
 
Table 3 presents the mean for the entire sample and each of the regimes (t-test results 
are available upon request to the authors.) Table 3 also includes some additional 
variables: labor allocation, farm and total household income that are not included in the 
multinomial logit model. Most variables vary across regimes. The excluded labor regime 
is regime 0, in which neither the operator nor the spouse work off-farm, the spouse does 
not work on the farm, and no hired labor is employed on the farm. Each marginal effect 
effect we report therefore represents the effect of an explanatory variable on the 




The results from the multinomial logit estimation of regime choice are presented in 
table 4. The McFadden R
 squared for the estimation is 0.1213, a level of explanatory 
power consistent with other estimates using cross-section data. The excluded labor 
regime is regime 0 in which no household member works off the farm, the spouse does 
not work on the farm and there is no hired labor. Each coefficient therefore represents the 
effect of an explanatory variable on the tendency of the farm family to choose a particular 
regime over the alternative of regime 0. Alternatively, one can think of each coefficient 
as the difference between the coefficients of a particular explanatory variable in the 
linearized indirect utility functions of a particular regime and of regime 0.  
 
One-tailed t-tests are used to evaluate whether coefficients significantly differ from 
zero. All explanatory variables have a statistically significant coefficient in at least one of 
the regression equations across regimes. Marginal effects are the partial derivatives of the 
event probability with respect to the independent variables of the model. These are 
reported in Table 5 and we note that there are far fewer marginal effects that are  10
significantly different from zero, and all but one of these occur in the equation for regime 
five where the spouse does not work on the farm, no household member works off the 
farm, and the farm uses hired labor. This regime differs from the omitted case only in the 
use of hired labor so analyzing these results offers some insight into the effects of 
government payments on labor regimes of these households that rely exclusively on the 
farm business for their employment. Both of the government payment variables included 
in the regression indicate small increases in the probability of hiring labor as the level of 
government payments increase from either source. These effects are of the same 
magnitude and are likely indicative of the proclivity for farm households solely engaged 
in farming to use increased earnings to expand farm production or productivity.   
 
In general the econometric results are disappointing in terms of significance of the 
results, but analysis of the marginal effects across regimes offers some insights into 
thinking about labor regime choices on farm households and what we might expect with 
improved results from better data. In only one case do the signs on the marginal effects 
between decoupled and coupled payments differ for the same regime equation. Regime 
six which differs from the omitted regime only in off-farm participation, indicates that 
decoupled payments increase the probability of off-farm work, while coupled payments 
decrease the probability. This is intuitive since decoupled programs do not depend on 
farm production and may even free the farm operator or spouse to pursue off-farm work 
with marginal time. Coupled payments on the other hand decrease the probability of off-
farm work since receipt of the payments is oriented to the level of production. 
 
Similarly, for a variable like household size, we see that in increased household size 
makes it more likely that the spouse works on the farm. The flexibility of farm work time 
and proximity to children drives the choice to adopt one of these labor regimes in cases 
where household size is large. Returning to the choice to include hired farm labor and the 
impact of government payments, we see that in regimes two and five both types of 
government payment levels tend to increase the choice of these regimes while in regimes 
four and seven the probability is reduced relative to the omitted regime. In comparing 
these cases, the key difference is whether a household member works off-farm or not. In 
regimes two and five which are more likely to be chosen with increased government 
payments, no one in the household works off the farm. The cases of regime four and 
seven have negative marginal effects and feature a household member working off-farm. 
Thus, we can consider government payments (of any form) related to farming to tend to 
reduce off-farm employment for farm households. 
 
As the previous discussion indicates, the large number of regimes makes for 
cumbersome interpretations of the marginal effects. To facilitate this, we aggregate the 
effects as in Benjamin et al. (2006), computing the marginal effects of the three regime 
criteria (spouse works on the farm, household member works off-farm, farm uses hired 
labor) for each variable, by adding up the marginal effects on the four categories in which 
the relevant criteria obtains the value 1. These are reported in table 6 and discussed 
below. 
  11
The results reported in Table 6 for combined marginal impact are all quite small in 
magnitude. This is particularly true for variables of interest such as the relative impact of 
farm versus non-farm net-worth and the level of coupled and decoupled payments 
received by the household. Household characteristics such as the operator’s age and 
education have larger marginal effects, but in some cases are difficult to interpret. For 
example, the effect negative linear term and positive quadratic term in age-squared for 
both cases of the spouse working on-farm and a household member working off-farm, 
indicate that spouse farm work and off-farm work decrease to some critical age of the 
operator at which point these forms of participation increase again. These results 
contradict typical expectations and likely result from the increased prevalence of multi-
operator farm businesses. This increase in multi-operator farms and the intergenerational 
management of the farm is difficult to deal with in cross-section but should be addressed 
in further work.  
 
As the number of members in the household increases, as expected, off farm work is 
more likely, and hired labor is less likely. We find that the operator’s spouse is more 
likely to work on the farm. As discussed previously, these households likely forego off-
farm work for the flexibility to match with the family needs. As expected, the higher the 
non farm net worth, the more likely the operator’s spouse will not work on the farm, and 
nobody will work off the farm. We also find that hired labor is less likely since the wealth 
level is unrelated to the farm business. The impact of government payments contradict 
the expectations offered in the literature review. In sum, both coupled and decoupled 
payments decrease the likelihood for the spouse to work on the farm, and increase the 
likelihood that a household member works off the farm. The differing signs for hired 
labor are in accord with expectations. Decoupled payments should not affect production 
and may actually reduce it, which makes it less likely for the farm to hire labor. The 
opposite being true for coupled payments. However, we should note that these results are 
not significant and are combinations of several marginal effects.  
 
Multivariate Probit Model 
The disappointing results of the multinomial logit results lead us to try a second 
specification. The second model used in this paper is a multivariate probit following 
Kimhi (1994) who created a discrete-choice model for labor decisions of farm couples. 
Our allocation model includes three equations. The dependent variables are binary 
choices on spouse work on the farm, household member off-farm work, and the use of 
hired labor consistent with our prior specification. 
 
While Benjamin and Kimhi (2006) argue effectively for the multinomial logit 
approach, the multivariate probit offers some advantages for this stage of our analysis. 
First, the multivariate probit model allows correlation between the residuals for the three 
choices, giving us a direct measure of cross-equation correlation Second, since our data 
favor combining off-farm work choices of both the spouse and operator into a single 
choice the multinomial regime model may be overly sensitive to this restriction since the 
combination reduces the regimes by one-half (from sixteen to eight). In comparison, we 
are just omitting one equation in the multivariate problem. Third, in light of the  12
unexpected results of the multinomial model with the government payments variables, we 
feel compelled to test our dataset a second time with a different model. 
 
The results of a three equation multivariate probit model are presented in Table 7. In 
comparison with the multinomial results, the results that change the most are the ones for 
the equation on hired labor. We discuss below only the results that are significant. 
Operator age and operator age squared do not have the expected effect on work off farm. 
This may suggest that early on, the farm owners need to work outside to finance the 
growth of the farm. As the farm and the operator ages, this becomes less needed and 
therefore less likely up to a certain age where it starts increasing again, maybe because 
the farm has reached a point where things are done more efficiently, less labor is needed 
and can be used on off farm activities. As the operators’ education increases, somebody is 
more likely to work off the farm because of the increased off farm well paid job 
opportunities, and therefore labor is hired to compensate. These results confirm the 
uncombined multinomial results that are also significant.  
 
Farms that are in sole proprietorship are more likely to have the spouse working on the 
farm and to hire labor, the latter is also found to be significant in the uncombined 
multinomial model. As household gets larger, somebody is more likely to work off the 
farm to support the large family. The combined multinomial results suggest this but are 
not significant. As the farm net worth increases, spouses are more likely to work on the 
farm, somebody is more likely to work off the farm (which was not expected), and hiring 
labor is more likely. More farm net worth may be an image of mature farms, where the 
operator may have on off-farm activities and delegate some of the responsibilities to the 
spouse and some labor to hired help.  
 
Our results on government payment are insignificant. The results for spouse work on 
farm and hired labor confirm the results of earlier papers. The latter result is also found in 
the non combined multinomial results and is significant. Indeed, government payments 
should make the farming business more profitable (higher on farm wage), the spouse is 
more likely to be involved and labor can be hired as well to run better the business or 
grow it. However, we do find the same results as in the multinomial model for off farm 
work: both types of payments make it more likely for somebody to work off the farm but 
the coefficients have a small magnitude. This suggests that the increased hired labor and 
spouse on farm labor, liberates some time for somebody to have on off farm job.  
 
The cross-equation correlation coefficients indicate that there is a significant 
relationship between decisions for the spouse to work on-farm and the use of hired labor. 
The positive sign suggests that spouse on farm work and hired labor are complementary 
(the presence of one increases the probability of the other),which is not consistent with a 
priori expectations.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study attempts to outline the role of operator’s spouse in on farm labor, the 
relationships between use of hired labor and spouse’s on farm labor, and the involvement 
in off farm job by estimating jointly spouse on farm work, off farm work, and hired labor  13
decisions. In 2003, in our dataset, about 53% of the operators’ spouses worked on the 
farm. About 73% of the farms had at least the operator or the operator’s spouse working 
off the farm. Finally, about 38% of the farms used hired labor.  
 
Our results are on average small in magnitude in both models. As the age of the 
operator increases, the farm is also more likely to hire labor, ceteris paribus, to 
compensate for the decreased physical performance of the operator (non combined 
multinomial result). The age of the operator has a convex effect on off-farm work 
suggesting that as the operator ages, off farm work becomes less needed to finance the 
growth off the farm up to a certain age when they start increasing their off farm activity 
again maybe because of farm labor efficiency gains (multivariate result). This same 
convex effect is found with spouse work on farm, suggesting that maybe spouse work on 
farm can be a substitute of operator work on farm if we assume that the operator is the 
one doing the off farm activity (non combined multinomial result). More education seems 
to be a proxy for better confidence and management of hired labor and opportunities for 
well paid off farm job, making the farm more likely to hire labor and have somebody 
with an off farm activity (non combined multinomial result and multivariate result. Farms 
that are in sole proprietorship are more likely to have the spouse working on the farm 
(multivariate result) and to hire labor (non combined multivariate and multinomial 
results) since there are not many owners/partners that can provide labor. As household 
gets larger, somebody is more likely to work off the farm to support the large family 
(multivariate result). As the farm net worth increases, spouses are more likely to work on 
the farm, somebody is more likely to work off the farm (which was not expected), and 
hiring labor is more likely (multivariate results). Both coupled and decoupled payments 
increase the chance to hire labor (non combined multinomial model) which is an 
extension to what previous studies have found. 
 
This analysis represents a novel addition by estimating jointly spouse on farm labor, off 
farm labor, and hired labor. Most of the previous literature did not look at all of these 
three effects and were not looking at joint estimation. Future improvements to this work 
should focus on the issues highlighted in the discussion of results. Additional influences 
on the choice of labor regimes such as demand for leisure time, health benefits, and other 
consumption side issues represent important extensions that would improve explanatory 
power of the model. 
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Table 1. Definitions, Means, and Standard Deviations of the Entire Sample 
Variable Description  Unit  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
OPHRS  Operator hours on farm  hours  2217.19  57.48
SPHRS  Spouse hours on farm  hours  443.81  13.11
OFFOPHRS  Operator hours off farm  hours  728.87  59.95
OFFSPHRS  Spouse hours off farm  hours  1091.31  29.75
HIRED  Hired labor expense  $  4858.15  464.39
AGE  Age of the operator  years  52.48  0.73
AGE^2  Age of the operator squared  years  2914.47  78.38
EDUC Operator  education  years  13.11  0.09
FARMORG 
Organization:  
1= Sole proprietor,  
0=Not a sole proprietor 
0/1 0.87  0.01
HH_SIZE  Household size   persons  3.22  0.06
NFNW  Non Farm Net Worth  $/1000  138.47  11.93
FNW  Farm Net Worth  $/1000  764.8  21.92
GP12 Decoupled  Payments  $/1000  11.82  0.58
GP34 Coupled  Payments  $/1000  4.59  0.30
Source: Agricultural Resource Management Survey (2003) 
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0 no  no  no  10%
1 yes  no  no  6%
2 yes  no  yes  7%
3 yes  yes  no  22%
4 yes  yes  yes  17%
5 no  no  yes  3%
6 no  yes  no  24%
7 no  yes  yes  10%
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Age of the operator  -0.01919   -0.01037   0.04279 
  
Age squared  0.00021   0.00005   -0.00052 
  
Operator Educ.  -0.04172   0.00227   0.02633 
  
Farm organization  0.11112   0.09985   0.23562 
  
Household size  0.04105   0.03042   -0.00594 
  
Non Farm Net Worth  -0.00007   -0.00000   -0.00005 
  
Farm Net Worth  0.00008   -0.00002   -0.00013 
  
Decoupled Payments  -0.00305   0.00049   -0.00397 
  
Coupled Payments  -0.00055   0.00155   0.00016 
  
Source: Authors’ estimates.  22
 








Age of the operator  0.0028    0.0009 *** 0.0016    
Age squared  0.0000    0.0000 *** 0.0000    
Operator Educ.  0.0008    0.0015 *** 0.0015  * 
Farm organization  0.0161  *** 0.0312   0.0171  * 
Household size  0.0029    0.0021 *** 0.0031    
Non Farm Net Worth  0.0000    0.0000   0.0000    
Farm Net Worth  0.0000  *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000  ** 
Decoupled Payments  0.0000    0.0000   0.0004    
Coupled Payments  0.0001    0.0000   0.0001    
Rho.SPHRS1.OFFHRS1 0.0050      
Rho.SPHRS1.hired1 0.0027  ***    
Rho.OFFHRS1.hired1 0.0031       
Source: Authors’ estimates.  
Notes:*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% or lower level, respectively. 
 
 
 